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“THE AGENT OF JESUS CHRIST”: PARTICIPATION OF FR. VITALI BOROVOY 
IN THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL AS AN OBSERVER FROM THE ROC 
Anastacia Wooden 
Anastacia Wooden is a PhD candidate in systematic theology at the Catholic University of 
America, Washington, DC. Her dissertation is devoted to the ecclesiology of Nicholas 
Afanasiev. Her work on this topic was published in the Journal of Ecumenical Studies. A native 
of Belarus, Ms. Wooden lives in Rockville, MD with her husband and four children. 
Precis 
 This is the hundredth anniversary of the birth of the Russian Orthodox theologian and church 
diplomat Fr. Vitali Borovoy (1916-2008). He actively participated in almost all external 
engagements of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the second half of the twentieth century: 
from inter-Orthodox relations to work in the World Council of Churches (WCC). His ecumenical 
career unfolded during challenging times for his church. Internally, it was determined by the 
tension between the Soviet state’s continual persecution of the ROC and its simultaneous 
demand that the ROC work for the state’s benefit in external relations. Externaly, it was affected 
by the Cold War and the solidification of the opposition between the West and the countries of 
the Soviet Block. No other assignment reflected these tensions as fully as Borovoy’s 
participation in the work of the Vatican Council II (Council) as an observer from the ROC. This 
paper commemorates the life and work of this remarkable person and pays particular attention to 
the circumstances that enabled and shaped his participation in the work of the Council.  
Prologue 
Fr. Vitali Borovoy is best known in the West as a prominent ecumenist and theologian. In 
Russia and his native Belarus, he is also remembered as a gifted pastor, passionate preacher, and 
talented pedagogue.1 In 1975, he visited the Harvard School of Divinity as a member of an 
1 It is not correct to call Borovoy “Russian.” His ethnicity was Belarusian and citizenship (nationality) was USSR 
for most of his life. The only time he called himself Russian was in the 1930s during his studies at Warsaw 
University in protest of the strong anti-Russian and anti-Orthodox sentiment there. For doing that he lost his 
scholarship. As he put it himself, “in Warsaw I am Russian, but in Russia I am Belarusian since Belarusians there 
are in the minority and need to stand up for their national interests.” See his 1999 interview with his younger friend, 
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ecumenical delegation from the ROC. Upon its arrival, the delegation was greeted by a group of 
protesters that objected to the presence of clerics from a communist country who, in their 
opinion, came to the USA as secret police agents to create an illusion of religious freedom in the 
USSR. Later, one of Harvard’s professors recounted Fr. Borovoy’s reaction to this protest: “Here 
we are called agents of KGB, in Moscow the atheists call us agents of bourgeois imperialism. 
But, we really are agents of Jesus Christ.”2  
 This brief story perfectly illustrates how Borovoy managed to transcend the tensions that 
shaped his life and accompanied all of the ecumenical activity of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
Caught between the oppressive control of the Soviet government and negative attitudes in the 
West in the wake of the Cold War, he remained faithful in his service to the Church. The intent 
of this paper is to commemorate the life and work of this remarkable person by providing a 
closer look at his participation in the work of the Second Vatican Council and his role in the 
political process that made this participation possible. 
 
Protopresbyter Vitali Borovoy 
 Vitali Borovoy3 was born in Belarus in 1916.4 His family was very poor and his father left for 
the United States in search of income. Apparently, Borovoy could have been born an American 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a priest in the Orthodox Church of Finland, Fr. Andrej Platonov, at http://www.kiev-
orthodox.org/site/personalities/1974/ (further referred to as Platonov). The audio recording of this conversation was 
passed on for safekeeping to the archives of St. Filaret’s Orthodox Theological Institute in Moskow and parts of it 
are posted on their website. 
2 Philip Weiss. “Three Russian Clerics Take in Harvard: Called Police Agents by Picketers,” The Crimson, March 1, 
1975. http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1975/3/1/three-russian-clerics-take-in-harvard/ 
3 Here I follow the way the Russian version of his name Виталий Боровой (Віталі Баравы in Belarusian) is 
transcribed in the Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement. Geneva: WCC Publications, 1991. “Borovoy,” 109. The 
World Council of Churches spells his first name as “Vitaly.” In Russian his first and last name end on a letter that 
can be transliterated as “y,” “i,” or “j.” Therefore, other spellings such as “Vitalij Borovoj” or “Borovoi” are 
acceptable. 
4 Borovoy was born in the predominantly Catholic region in the village Nesterovka (now Dokshicy rajon in Vitebsk 
oblast of Belarus) when it was part of the Russian Empire. In 1921 this territory became part of Poland under the 
Treaty of Riga between Poland, Soviet Russia (acting also on the behalf of Soviet Belarus) and Soviet Ukraine 
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but his pregnant mother was turned down by sanitary controls in Klaipeda and could not follow 
her husband.5 His father then got sick and died the year Vitali was born. Although his parents 
were illiterate, Vitali, who attended compulsory elementary school, soon discovered a love of 
learning and became, in his own words, “a bookoholic.”6 His aptitude for learning was noticed 
and with the help of a local priest, his mother managed to secure the only free education he could 
receive—that in the Vilnia Theological Seminary. 7 He graduated as a top student and continued 
his studies in 1936 at the Orthodox Department of Warsaw University—which he did not finish 
in the wake of the German occupation of Poland in 1939. During the German occupation of 
Belarus, there was a certain revival of religious life and Borovoy found work in the ecclesiastical 
sphere—he served in clerical and secretarial positions in the diocese in Minsk. In 1944, fleeing 
German authorities tried to deport Belarusian clergy and other church activists to Germany, but 
Borovoy and his wife managed to escape from the train. However, he immediately fell under 
suspicion from the returning Soviet authorities,8 and to avoid imminent arrest, agreed to be 
installed as a deacon and then a priest in an expedited fashion. 
 Borovoy’s first pastoral assignment was at the Sts. Peter and Paul Cathedral in Gomel 
(Belarus) where he blossomed as a pastor and homilist. He was one of a few priests who 
preached at every liturgy, no matter the number of the faithful present. So good were his 
homilies that he was forced by the Soviet authorities to leave this parish precisely because his 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
following the end of the Polish-Soviet war. In 1939 the Soviet-Polish boarder was re-drawn again by the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and Borovoy’s native village became part of Soviet Belarus. This is a situation similar to 
the one reflected in a popular joke about a “well-travelled” man who was born in Romania, studied in Hungary, got 
married in Czech Republic, worked in Poland, and died in the Soviet Union – all while he never left his village in 
Transcarpathia. 
5 Platonov. 
6 "Чем отличается прямота от правды: Памяти о. Виталия Борового." April 7, 2014. 
http://psmb.ru/community/article/chem-otlichaetsja-prjamota-ot-pravdy-4760/ 
7 “Vilnia” is a Belarusian name and “Vilno” is a Polish name for the city that is now Vilnius, the capital of 
Lithuania. 
8 About 90% of all Soviet soldiers and civilians that were held in any way – whether as POWs or as a forced labor - 
by the German occupants were later persecuted by the Soviet authorities. 
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preaching made him very popular with the faithful. In his later pastoral assignments in Geneva 
and Moscow, people continued to come to listen to Borovoy preach—despite his thick 
Belarusian accent and occasional stuttering. In the late eighties, Moscow intelligentsia risked 
their freedom to record his homilies with recorders hidden in their clothing9 and stood in long 
lines after the services seeking his spiritual direction.10 
 After Gomel, Borovoy was directed by the ecclesiastical authorities toward an academic 
career: first re-organizing and teaching at the Minsk Theological Seminary (1944-1954), then 
teaching at the Leningrad Theological Academy (1954-62), where he also formally completed 
his theological education, and later teaching at the Moscow Theological Academy (1973-1978). 
Borovoy remembered his years in Leningrad as the happiest time of his life because he was 
working in the same place where his “idol,”prominent Russian Orthodox church historian, Vasili 
Bolotov (1854-1900), used to teach. In fact, young Borovoy never wanted to be either a church 
diplomat or even a priest. All he wanted to be was a church historian, if not as grand and famous 
as Bolotov himself, then, as he put it, at least like a “little Bolotov,” bolotovchik. 
 As a teacher, Borovoy stood out by his extensive knowledge of church history, passionate 
lecturing style, and generosity toward his students when they were in need either of his time and 
attention or his many books. For his theological contributions, Borovoy was awarded doctoral 
degrees from Moscow Theological Academy, University of Bern (Switzerland), Charles 
                                                          
9 Some of these homilies were published in Протопресвитер Виталий Боровой. Быть свидетелями Христа. 
Проповеди. Moscow: St. Filaret’s Orthodox Christian Institute, 2006. They can be also found at 
http://azbyka.ru/propovedi/byt-svidetelyami-xrista-propovedi-protoiereya-vitaliya-borovogo.shtml, 
http://pravoslavnayaobshina.ru/ebook/PO_n22.pdf. 
10 "Человек, который никого не предавал:" Интервью со свящ. Георгием Кочетковым к 95-летию со дня 
рождения протопресвитера Виталия Борового (1916-2008). http://psmb.ru/community/article/chelovek-kotoryi-
nikogda-ne-predaval-1874/ 
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University in Prague (Czech Republic), and St. Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary 
(USA).11  
 As with many things in his life, Borovoy’s engagement in the ROC’s ecumenical activities 
was not part of his plan. In Borovoy’s own description, his blissful teaching career “was ruined” 
after he “showed off” his knowledge of patristic fathers during the 1956 (July 16-23) Anglican-
Orthodox consultation in Moscow where he presented the paper “Symbol of Faith and the 
Councils.”12 His contribution impressed the head of the Anglican delegation, Archbishop 
Michael Ramsey, caught the eye of the ROC’s leadership,13 and consequently ensured his 
transfer to the Department for External Church Relations in 1959.14 Thus began his long and 
fruitful career in the ROC’s external relations: participating in Pan-Orthodox conferences in 
Rhodes, preparing and achieving the entry of the ROC into the WCC, serving as a member and 
assistant director of the Faith and Order Committee (1966-1972), a member of its Central 
Committee and the Faith and Order Standing Committee, and a member of the joint Working 
Group of the WCC and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) (1965-1972), to name a few. From 
1984 to 1995, Borovoy worked as the deputy director of the Department for External Church 
Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, and remained its consultant until his death in 2008. 
 His work at the Department for External Church Relations was conducted in complicated 
conditions determined by official Soviet religious policy. These conditions and the challenges 
they created for the members of the Department can only be understood in light of the Soviet 
religious politics.  
                                                          
11 This paper is not going to address Borovoy’s theological contributions. 
12  Full text was published as: Прот. В. Боровой. "Символ веры и соборы," Журнал Московской Патриархии, 
[Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate] issue 9, 1956, 58-62. 
13 "Мне верили абсолютно: Памяти отца Bиталия Борового." April 7, 2015. 
http://psmb.ru/community/article/mne-verili-absoljutno-5555/ 
14 In Russian: Отдел внешних церковных сношений Московского Патриархата (ОВЦС), created in 1946.  
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 ROC and Its Ecumenical Activity in Light of the Soviet Religious Politics15 
 The communist doctrine of the Soviet state had an unequivocaly negative view of religion as 
“the opium of the masses” that stood in the way of society’s progress and needed to be removed 
if a better future was to be achieved. In practice, it amounted to a continuous physical and 
ideological assault on all religious institutions and sentiments that began immediately after the 
1917 revolution in Russia. The physical destruction of the ROC’s clergy and property was 
carried out with a particular intensity during Stalin’s regime in the 1930s. In total, between 1917 
and 1935, 130,000 priests were arrested and 95,000 of them executed,16 and all of over 1,000 
monasteries and over 60,000 churches were closed (leaving only about 100 churches opened). 
Over 400 bishops were persecuted and 250 of them were executed or died in prison, leaving only 
four acting bishops. By different estimations, the total number of those suffered for faith ranged 
from 500,000 to 1,000,000.17 This desperate situation meant that the physical survival of the 
ROC in the USSR was a very real concern. 
 World War II (WWII) brought real changes to the unrelenting battle with religion. As 
German troops quickly advanced through the Soviet territories, Stalin needed all the help he 
could get to unite the nation and raise its morale for battle with a common enemy.  When 
Metropolitan Sergij (Starogorodskij), the head of the ROC, on the first day of the Great Patriotic 
War (WWII as it pertains to the USSR)—June 22, 1941, appealed to Orthodox believers to join 
forces against the fascist threat, they responded with energetic patriotic activity which included 
                                                          
15 For more detailed account see author’s research presented at the conference “Vatican II: Remembering the 
Future” (Georgetown University, May 2015). Full text is scheduled for publication in 2016 under the title “Russian 
Orthodox Observers at Vatican II in the Context of Soviet Religious Politics.” 
16 One of them was prominent theologian Fr. Pavel Florensky who was arrested in 1928 and executed in 1937. 
17 Н. Емельянов. “Оценка статистики гонений на Русскуя Православную Церковь с 1917 по 1952гг." 
Богословский сборник Свято-Тихоновского богословского института, № 3, 1999, 258-274. P. 264. 
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the collecting of funds and clothing for the troops and the blessing of the troops heading to the 
war zone.18 To ensure the continual support of the faithful, Stalin responded by minimizing, but 
never completely ceasing, active persecution of clergy to its lowest level. In addition, he 
permitted the restoration of active ecclesial life and even authorized an unprecedented meeting 
with a group of the ROC’s hierarchs, which eventually led to the election of the Patriarch for the 
first time since the death of Partriach Tikhon in 1925. 
 This pragmatic approach to religious policy continued after the end of WWII. In exchange 
for physical survival and some breathing space for activity, the ROC was expected to serve the 
objectives of the Soviet interests abroad through its international contacts and engagements. The 
ROC’s Department for External Church Affairs, formed in 1949, became the main tool for the 
implementation of this policy under the close supervision of specially designated government 
agencies—the Council for the Religious Affairs, and more specifically, the Council for ROC 
Affairs—which were customarily staffed with KGB operatives. 
 The work of the Department closely followed the objectives of Soviet foreign policies. Two 
of these objectives were directly connected with or led to the presence of ROC observers at the 
Council. First, the Soviet government wanted to establish tighter control over the countries of the 
so-called Eastern Block through the contacts between the ROC and the national churches of 
these predominantly Orthodox countries. Now that the influence of the USSR extended over the 
canonical territories of the Serbian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Polish, Albanian and Czech Orthodox 
churches, and it had control over about 85 percent of the Orthodox population of the world,19 
Soviet strategists were actively looking for ways to unite the world Orthodoxy around Moscow 
                                                          
18 S. Bolotov. Russian Orthodox Church and Foreign Policy of the USSR in 1930s-1950. Moscow, 2011. In Russian. 
[С. В. Болотов. Русская православная церковь и международная политика СССР в 1930е - 1950е годы. 
Москва: Издательство Круцитского подворья, 2011.] P. 50. 
19 Bolotov, 126. 
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rather than Constantinople. Parallel to taking control over the Orthodox churches in the Eastern 
Block, Soviet foreign policy also desired to minimize Catholic influence in the above-mentioned 
regions. This objective was swiftly accomplished by suppressing, to the point of physical 
elimination, the Eastern Catholic churches in Ukraine, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the 
Carpathian region within about five years of the end of WWII.20 
 Second, the Soviet government wanted to extend its influence past its Eastern European 
allies. It was looking for ways to nurture sympathy for the USSR’s ideology and politics among 
the people of Western Europe. The Vatican’s anti-communist stance was viewed as a major 
obstacle in reaching this objective. It was to be counteracted by an intense ideological assault, 
the main lines of which were well summarized in the authoritative Grand Soviet Encyclopedia, 
published in 1951, where the Papal State was named “an oppressor of free human thought, a 
messenger of obscurantism, a tool of Anglo-American imperialism, and an active instigator of a 
new imperialist world war.”21 In contrast to this papal anti-democratic force in the service of 
capitalist oppressors, the USSR was promoted as a true defender of people’s interests. 
Ideological warfare was also designed to create discontent with ecclesial hierarchy within the 
RCC itself with a far-reaching goal of breaking the RCC into a number of local churches by 
dissolving their ties with the Holy See.22 
 Stalin’s death in 1953 and the ascent of Nikita Khrushchev as the new Chairman of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) brought changes both to the general religious 
politics and to the attitude towards the Vatican. New religious policies had an ideological, rather 
than pragmatic, basis. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev announced a grandiose 
                                                          
20 Anti-uniate campaign in Ukraine was personally coordinated by USSR’s future leader Nikita Khrushchev who 
reported directly to Stalin. See Bolotov, 135. 
21 See entry “Ватикан” [Vatican] in Bolshaya sovetskaya enciklopediya (2nd edition), Volume 7, (Moscow: BSE, 
1951), 55. 
22 Bolotov, 200. 
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goal of completing the creation of communist society in 20 years (by 1980). Since the ROC 
steadily grew in the post-war years, liquidation of all religious institutions and sentiments had to 
be intensified in different forms to meet this “deadline.”23 Persecution of the ROC now included 
not only closures of parishes and monasteries, loss of properties and additional taxation, but even 
meddling with the canonical structure of the Church. As the head of the Department for External 
Church Relations Metropolitan Nikolai summed up these efforts, “the objective is unmistakably 
to annihilate the Church and religion in general, more profoundly and broadly than in the 
1920s.”24 
 Nevertheless, the state’s expectations for the ROC to continue its international activity for the 
benefit of Soviet foreign interests remained unchanged. When Vatican II was called, the ROC 
was supposed to maintain the same negative position towards the RCC in general and the 
upcoming Council in particular. Interestingly, the possibility of sending observers to the Council 
was discussed already in March of 1959 during the meeting between Metropolitan Nikolaj and a 
Chairman of the Council for ROC Affairs G. Karpov, long before the intention to invite 
observers to the Council was officially announced on June 26, 1960.25 Both sides concluded that 
the ROC’s participation could be further discussed only if the Council would not be an 
exclusively “unity council,” but would address other issues, such as world peace. Still, in April 
1959, Patriarch Alexij spoke sharply against any participation, followed by a similar publication 
in the Patriarchate’s official publication, Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarchii.26 When Cardinal Bea 
in his interview to Giornale del Popolo (March 1961), suggested that the ROC should show 
                                                          
23 Aleksij Marchenko. Religious Politics of the Soviet State in the Years of Rule of N. S. Khrushchev and Its 
Influence on the Church Life in the USSR. (Moscow, 2010). In Russian. [Протоиерей Алексий Марченко. 
Религиозная политика советского государства в годы правления Н. С. Хрущева и её влияние на церковную 
жизнь в СССР. (Москва: Издательство Круцитского подворья, 2010),]  264. 
24 Shkarovskii, 78. 
25 "Ватиканский II собор," in Православная Энциклопедия, ed. Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus Kirill, 
http://www.pravenc.ru/text/149919.html. 
26 “Refutation.” Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarchii [Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate], issue 7, 1959, 10. 
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some initiative in procuring an invitation to the Council, it was taken as an insult to which the 
Moscow Patriarchate indirectly replied with the anonymous article Non possumus, published in 
the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate in May 1961.27 This article, in a succinct way, presented 
two theological objections to the Council that were shared by all Orthodox churches. First, it 
expressed disagreement with the presumptuous way the Council was called “ecumenical,” 
reflecting Rome’s temptation of a monarchical centralization of power. It asserted that only the 
power of love could unite Christians in the Church as a Body of Christ. Second, the article 
voiced the suspicion that the RCC must have vaguely felt that an “ecumenical council” cannot be 
called without the participation of the Eastern churches and therefore, by inviting observers from 
the Orthodox churches and other Christian confessions to the Council, the RCC wanted to create 
an illusion of “ecumenicity.”28 For these reasons, but without enmity towards the Catholics, so 
the anonymous author claims, the Moscow Patriarchate was compelled to reply with a 
resounding Non possumus! (like Peter in Acts 4:20) to Cardinal Bea and to any Orthodox 
participation in the Council. Later, at a pan-Orthodox conference, which took place from 
September to October of 1961 in Rhodes, the Moscow patriarchate also took a strong anti-
Vatican and anti-ecumenical stance and promoted a resolution calling the Orthodox churches to 
make decisions in ecumenical relations only in the presence of complete consensus.  
 At a second pan-Orthodox conference in September-October 1963, however, the ROC’s 
delegation joined Constantinople’s delegation in promoting a resolution “to initiate an equitable 
dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church.”29 This radical shift in the ROC’s position had to 
reflect an equally radical change in the Soviet leadership’s attitude towards the Vatican. It is a 
                                                          
27 “Non Possumus!” Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarchii [Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate], issue 5, 1961, 73-75. 
28 Illustrating this concern of the Orthodox churches, Charles Napier speaks of “the genuine confusion which existed 
for a time as to whether the Council was to be a “Council of Union,” to which all would be invited, or not.” Napier, 
Charles. “The Orthodox Church and the Second Vatican Council,” Diakonia, vol 1 (3), 1966, 175-193. 
29 Shkarovskii, 88. 
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widely held opinion among scholars of modern church history that this change began with the 
election of Pope John XXIII. The new Pope’s “down-to-earth” personality, his tireless peace 
efforts,30 and his commitment to defending the poor and the oppressed, which earned him a title 
of the “Red Pope,” personally appealed to Khrushchev. Many of the Pope’s actions—like his 
speech in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Berlin crisis (September 1961) and especially of 
the Cuban crisis (October 1962)—were interpreted as an indicator of an extremely anti-American 
stance,31 welcomed by the Soviet leadership. For Khrushchev, this signaled a new opportunity to 
use contacts with the Vatican to promote Soviet interests by widening the social basis for 
communist ideas in Western countries, but also to find new sources of financial support for a 
struggling Soviet economy. Since Soviet politicians lacked any understanding of the Vatican’s 
religious motives and interpreted its motives as strictly political in nature, the Vatican’s concern 
for the situation of believers in the USSR was considered to be “more formal than essential in 
nature and thus could be ignored.”32 Consequently, in the midst of an internal anti-religious 
campaign, Soviet diplomats and security agencies began their efforts to reach out to the Vatican 
and the ROC was expected to contribute accordingly. As Borovoy himself summed up, “the high 
esteem in which John XXIII had come to be held in the eyes of Moscow with his politics of 
peace and reconciliation had shown the Russian Church the green light in closer relations with 
Rome.”33 
 The ROC welcomed the new opportunity for engagement with the RCC. The new head of the 
Department for External Church Relations (since June 1960) Metropolitan Nikodim (Rotov) was 
                                                          
30 At this time the USSR saw itself as a leader in the world peace movement and the ROC had to support its many 
peace initiatives. As Borovoy later joked, “we fought for peace so hard that we barely survived.” 
31 Karlov, 297. 
32 Karlov 297. 
33 Vitaly Borovoi. “The Second Vatican Council and its Significance for the Russian Orthodox Church” in The Holy 
Russian Church and Western Christianity. Ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Oscar Beozzo. (Concilium 1996/6) 
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 1996), 135. 
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especially enthusiastic about it because he saw international outreach as the Church’s main 
means of survival and improvement of its situation. Borovoy, who became Metropolitan 
Nikodim’s deputy, also supported this position. Working closely together, Nikodim, a shrewd 
diplomat, and Borovoy, an expert theologian, played key roles in convincing the authorities to 
allow the ROC’s participation in the Council. As Borovoy put it,  
 Our entry into all the aspects of the world ecumenical movement were bound up with our 
hopes of survival and of a change in our situation… For us these were the hard times of 
Khrushchev’s attack on the church. It was for this reason, too, that we joined the World 
Council of Churches in Geneva and sent observers to the Second Vatican Council in 
Rome. We needed to exploit all this to the maximum in favor of the church.34 
 In this way, during the preparatory period of the Vatican II (1959-1962), the desire of the 
Soviet state and of the ROC for an international outreach auspiciously coincided with the 
Vatican’s ecumenical outreach in inviting the observers to the Council. Perhaps the difference in 
the objectives of all three parties contributed to the complexity of what an original member of 
Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, Fr. Thomas Stransky, called a “tangled mass of events 
and intentions” that surrounded the process by which the ROC received and responded to an 
invitation to send its observers to the Council.35 
 The invitations to the observers were handled by the recently created (June 5, 1960) 
Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity (SPCU), headed by its President Cardinal Augustin 
Bea and the Secretary Bishop Johannes Willebrands. Prior to sending official invitations, the 
SPCU initiated contacts with various Christian churches to investigate whether a positive reply 
to these invitations could be expected. In February 1961, Msgr. Willebrands visited 
Constantinople and was assured by the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras of his interest in 
sending observers. The Patriarch informed all the churches, including the Moscow Patriarchate, 
                                                          
34 Borovoy 137. 
35 Stransky, Thomas F. “The Foundation of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity” in Vatican II by Those 
Who Were There. London: Chapman, 1986, 62-87.   P. 78. 
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about his contacts with Msgr. Willebrands. So  in May 1961, when the Moscow Patriarchate’s 
official journal published the already mentioned article Non possumus, it was received by the 
SPCU as a quasi-official negative response to its initiative. Therefore, when in July 1962, the 
SPCU’s President Cardinal Augustin Bea formally invited Patriarch Athenagoras to delegate 
observers, similar letters were sent directly to other Patriarchates (such as Alexandria, Antioch, 
Jerusalem, Greece, Cyprus), but not to the Moscow Patriarchate.36  
 Only through personal contacts between Willebrands and Metropolitan Nikodim (with 
Borovoy serving as an interpreter), at a meeting for WCC’s Central Committee in August 1962, 
was it clarified that the ROC actually had an interest in sending its observers as long as the 
Council would not make anti-Soviet pronouncements. Around the same time, The Journal of the 
Moscow Patriarchate published an interview of Patriarch Alexii where he clarified that in the 
absence of invitation, no definitive decision could be made.37 To explore this interest, 
Willebrands visited Moscow in an official capacity and in strictest secrecy two weeks before the 
opening of the Council on September 27 to October 2, 1962. It was the first-ever visit of a 
Vatican official to the USSR.38  In his talks with the ROC’s authorities as well as representatives 
of the Department for Religious Affairs in Moscow, Msgr. Willebrands received an assurance 
that an invitation from the Vatican would be positively received.  
 Until this day, there is no agreement between Rome, Constantinople, and Moscow on the 
order of events that unfolded following this visit. According to Stransky, Cardinal Bea sent an 
invitation to the ROC by telegraph and express mail on October 4, 1962. On October 6, Patriarch 
Athenagoras contacted both Bea and Moscow Patriarch Alexis to find out whether the ROC 
                                                          
36 Stransky, 78. 
37 “Ответы Патриарха Московского и всея Руси Алексия на вопросы г-на Жана Булье,” Zhurnal Moskovskoj 
Patriarchii [Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate], no. 9, 1962, 15. 
38 Stransky, 79. 
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would be sending observers, but he did not receive a definitive response. So the next day, on 
October 7, he declined the invitation to send the observers for lack of unanimity between the 
Orthodox churches (mainly, due to the dissent of the Greek Orthodox Church and the ROC) in 
accordance with the decision of the 1961 pan-Orthdodox conference to act together in 
ecumenical matters. However, on October 11, the opening day of the Council, the SPCU 
received a telegram from Moscow about sending observers, who promptly arrived the next day. 
 In an interview given in 1963, Borovoy gave a slightly different account of the events.39 
Borovoy insisted that the ROC received the RCC’s invitation only on October 10, one day before 
the opening of the Council. The Holy Synod of the ROC then immediately held a meeting, which 
made the decision to send observers. Borovoy also insisted that Athenagoras’ decision not to 
send observers was not made in consultation with the ROC. He says that they received a wire 
regarding Athenagoras’ decision on October 10, when it was too late to change their mind 
because on that day, the highest organ of Soviet power, the Politburo of CPSU, already adopted a 
resolution proposed by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and approved by the KGB to send 
Protopresbyter Vitali Borovoy and Archmandrite Vladimir Kotliarov as the observers to the 
Council.40 Borovoy adds that he and his colleague Kotliarov were very surprised upon their 
arrival to Rome to find out that they were the only Orthodox observers at the first session of the 
Council.41 
                                                          
39 Eva-Maria Jung,“Table-Talk with the Russian Observers,” in The Catholic World, February 1963, vol. 196, no. 1, 
277. 
40 Adriano Roccucci. “Russian Observers at Vatican II. The ‘Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs’ and the 
Moscow Patriarchate between Anti-Religious Policy and International Strategies” in Vatican II in Moscow (1959-
1965). (Leuven: Bibliotheek van de Faculteit Godgeleerdheid. 1997), 69. 
41 In fact, ROC’s representatives were not the only Orthodox at the first session of the Council: there were also 
present as guests of the SPCU Bishop Cassien from the St. Sergius’ Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris and Fr. 
Alexander Schmemann from St. Vladimir’s Orthodox Seminary in Crestwood, New York; observers from the 
Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia Bishop Anthony of Geneva, Fr. Troyanoff from Switzerland, and Prof. 
Grotoff from Rome; and the WCC representative, the Greek Orthodox Nikos Nissiotis.  However, ROC was the 
only Orthodox church to send its observers. After Paul VI’s pilgrimage to Jerusalem where he acknowledged nostra 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JULY 2016) XXXVI, 4 14
 It is possible that both accounts are correct in facts, but not in assumptions. For example, the 
fact that a wire was sent from Rome to Moscow on a certain day does not necessarily mean that 
it reached the intended receiver on the same day. After all, communications between the ROC, 
Rome, and Constantinople were closely monitored and controlled by the Soviet authorities. This 
hypothesis is supported by the fact, pointed out by Alberto Melloni, that “already in 1963 an 
article appearing in Reforme argued that the telegram from Constantinople with which the 
Ecumenical Patriarch informed Moscow of the decision not to send observers to Rome had been 
blocked by the Communist Party.”42 This action would be perfectly in line with the desire of the 
Soviet authorities to undermine the influence of Patriarch Athenagoras, whom they saw as an 
American puppet attempting to “increase its influence on Orthodoxy to the detriment of the 
Moscow Patriarchate.”43 Borovoy himself used this desire to convince the authorities to send the 
observers to the Council when he wrote in his influential report on Msgr. Willebrands’ visit that 
“thanks to the decision made in Rhodes for orthodoxy to act together, Constantinople had not 
sent its observers yet and the ROC still has a chance to do so and, consequently, be in position of 
influencing Orthodoxy in opposition to Constantinople’s Western orientation.”44  
 Needless to say, the way in which the ROC ended up being the only Orthodox church to send 
its observers to the first session of the Council caused considerable tensions between Rome, 
Constantinople, and Moscow. However, as Stransky stresses, “in all this muddle and its 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
culpa of RCC in the relationships with the Orthodox churches, the Greek Orthodox Church finally consented to 
sending observers. So at the third session of the Council there were observers from the Greek Orthodox Church as 
well as the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Patriarchate of Alexandria. 
42 Melloni, 100, note 33. 
43 Roccucci, 52. 
44 Roccucci, 67. Borovoy’s other argument was that rejection of the invitation would undermine the reputation of the 
reforming Pope John XXIII and strengthen the position of reactionary-conservative camp, which now lost control 
over the preparation of the Council. Roccucci, 66. 
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aftermath, Monsignor Willebrands, Cardinal Bea, Pope John and Patriarch Athenagoras 
exercised holy diplomacy: all four uttered not a public word.”45  
At the Council 
 All the tensions of the secular and ecclesiastical politics mentioned above remained present at 
the Council and conditioned the work of the ROC observers, and especially of Borovoy, who 
was an acknowledged leader of his delegation at all four sessions. In fact, these tensions 
manifested themselves as soon as Borovoy and Kotliarov set foot in Rome. While they were 
warmly welcomed by the SPCU and the Pope, who saw in their arrival an opportunity for the 
development of genuine fraternal relations with the ROC, some bishops were resentful of the 
presence of the clerics from the communist country whom they perceived as secret KGB agents 
that arrived to the Council with a single goal of promoting Soviet interests. Of the latter, none 
were more “deeply shocked and offended” by the presence of the ROC observers than the 
Ukraininan Catholic bishops.46 They were insulted not by the personalities of the observers or by 
their Orthodox faith,47 but by their association with the USSR, which completely wiped out the 
Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine in 1945 by physical destruction and forced conversions to 
Russian Orthodoxy. In their evaluation of these events, the Ukrainiane bishops viewed the Soviet 
authority and the leadership of the ROC as one acting subject and did not see substantial 
difference in their motivation and goals.48 So deep was their indignation at the mere presence of 
                                                          
45 Stransky, 80. 
46 Karim Schelkens, “Vatican Diplomacy after the Cuban Missile Crisis: New Light on the Release of Josyf Slipyj.” 
The Catholic Historical Review, vol. 97, no. 4, 2011: 692. 
47 On the contrary, the head of the Ukrainian Catholic delegation Metropolitan Maxim Hermaniuk stressed the need 
for the Orthodox presence during the preparatory period of the Council. See Peter Galadza. “The Council Diary of 
Metropolital Maxim Hermaniuk and Turning Points in the History of the Catholic Church: An Interpretation.” In 
Vatican II: Experience canadiennes/Canadian Experiences. Ed. Michael Attridge, et al. (Ottawa: University of 
Ottawa Press. 2011), 232. 
48 It is significant to note that while serving as a Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the 
Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad (now the Patriarch of Moscow and All the 
Rus) said in this respect in an interview to the journal La Croix on March 12, 1991: “It is not our church but Stalin 
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the ROC observers that they used all available means to “evict” them from the Council 
including—to the Pope’s displeasure—making their feelings public.49 
 At the Council the ROC’s observers had to fulfill a double duty of promoting interests of the 
Soviet propaganda as well as interests of their church. To ensure that ROC’s churchmen only 
made politically correct statements in line with the party interests, their delegation always 
included secretaries or translators who were real staff KGB agents,50 like Nikolay Afinogenov at 
the first, second, and fourth sessions and Boris Neliubin at the third and fourth sessions. 
Moreover, Borovoy and other ROC representatives were not allowed to attend any official 
functions without such “translators” even though the translators at the Council were provided by 
the Russicum. As a result, ROC representatives did follow the script and formally made 
statements insisting on the existence of proper religious freedom in the USSR. 51 
 In these conditions, any attempt to relate the true situation of the church in the USSR 
required diplomatic skill and personal courage.52 Direct by nature, Borovoy had to learn the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
who banned the Uniates... I was always convinced that when our public life was normalized, the Uniates would 
certainly have the right to exist. In my view the Greek Catholic Church should give up proselytism and serve as a 
bridge between West and East. But if it is to do that, it should use the theology of the Second Vatican Council in its 
thought and praxis.” Quoted from Georgy Zyablitsev, “The Measures Taken by the Moscow Patriarchate between 
1990 and 1992 to Settle the Interconfessional Conflict in West Ukraine” in The Holy Russian Church and Western 
Christianity. Ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Oscar Beozzo. (Concilium 1996/6) (Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 1996),128. 
49 For more on the actions of the Ukrainian bishops see The Second Vatican Council Diaries of Metropolitan Maxim 
Hermaniuk, C.SS.R. (1960-1965). Transl. Jaroslav Z. Skira. (Leuven: Peeters. 2012), especially the entries right after 
the opening of the Council. According to Schelkens, “John XXIII personally asked Bea to prevent such an action by 
the Ukrainian bishops.” Schelkens, 699. 
50 As Borovoy used to joke, “where two or three Orthodox gather together, one of them is a snitch (stukach).” He 
himself lived by the principle, that only God can be totally trusted. See personal reminiscences of the staff members 
of the Department for the External Church Relations “К 65-летию ОВЦС: люди отдела. Протопресвитер 
Виталий Боровой” at http://www.taday.ru/text/1156888.html. 
51 For example, at the hight of Khrushchev’s persecution in August of 1963 Metropolital Nikodim stated in an 
interview to Detroit Free Press (on the occasion of the ROC’s delegation coming to the meeting of the Central 
Committee of the WCC) that the relationship of the Orthodox Church to the government in Russia is comparable to 
the relationship of U.S. churches to the government in the U.S., because both are separate from the government “but 
operate within a constitutional framework that permits communication with the government.” Detroit Free Press, 
August 31, 1963 page 4. Can be found at http://freep.newspapers.com/newspage/99125412/. 
52 Borovoy used to tell an anecdote that well illustrates how the churchmen from the Soviet Union on an everyday 
basis had to find ways to “feed the wolf but save the sheep.” At his first meeting with the General Secretary of the 
WWC, Visser’t Hooft, Borovoy decided to make a gesture that would demonstrate that he was not a Soviet spy. So 
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difference between directness and truthfulness in diplomatic engagements.53 On their part, 
Western collegues knew about the ROC’s overseers and made sure that candid discussions took 
place only on a one-on-one basis. In general, at the Council, the SPCU encouraged by all means 
such informal contacts between the observers and the other participants and the development of 
the “community-in-dialogue.”54 All Eastern and Asian, and most Anglican and Protestant 
observers and SPCU guests lodged (room and meal) together at the Pensione Castello, sat 
together at the General Congregations in a reserved tribune next to the patriarchs, prayed 
together at the daily Mass at St. Peter’s Basilica,55 and spent free time together enjoying 
receptions regularly organized by different host organizations and communities in Rome.56 The 
SPCU provided all observers with qualified translators, and starting from the second session of 
the Council, made daily digests of the previous day’s speeches in the native languages of the 
observers. Therefore, they could attend fewer meetings but spend more time in informal 
discussions. It is hard to find records of such informal contacts, but judging by the evaluations of 
his ecumenical collegues, Borovoy managed to earn their trust and respect. As one of them put it, 
he addressed the Secretary in a mixture of different languages none of which he knew well enough to speak at that 
point: German, English and Latin, saying, “We wish to learn what WCC is doing for the Christian unity.” This 
shocked the Secretary and infuriated his KGB-appointed interpreter Alekseev as a flagrant violation of a direct order 
to inquire only about what WCC does for peace, not Christian unity. In this case Borovoy’s risk paid off: from 
ROC’s perspective, Visser’t Hoofs understood Borovoy’s intention and welcomed him as a true representative of his 
church; from the KGB’s perspective he “succeeded” in getting access into circles that were previously out of reach 
for any other “Soviets.” See "Мне верили абсолютно: Памяти отца Bиталия Борового." April 7, 2015. 
http://psmb.ru/community/article/mne-verili-absoljutno-5555/. 
53 "Чем отличается прямота от правды: Памяти о. Виталия Борового." April 7, 2014. 
http://psmb.ru/community/article/chem-otlichaetsja-prjamota-ot-pravdy-4760/ 
54 Thomas F. Stransky, “Paul VI and the Delegated Observers/Guests to Vatican Council II.” In Paolo VI e 
l’ecumenismo: Colloquio internazionala di studio. Bresia, September 25-27, 1998. Pubblicazioni dell’Istituto Paolo 
VI, no. 23, 129. 
55 “But perhaps the thing which did most to draw us together was that we worshipped together every morning. Each 
morning began with a Mass in St. Peter’s at a nave altar close to where the Observers sat. In the early days some of 
the Observers felt that they could not attend this service… [eventually], though some of them began by sitting 
rigidly in their chairs, gradually they began to follow the service in their books, to stand for the Gospel, to bow their 
heads at the elevation of the Host, and so on.” John R. H. Moorman, “Observers and Guests of the Council,” in 
Vatican II by Those Who Were There. (London: Chapman, 1986), 167-168.   
56 According to the author’s private conversation with Stransky, because of these receptions Fr. Borovoy could not 
visit Paulist’s weekly Sunday brunches because anything “American” was strictly forbidden to him. 
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“[t]here were surely those who thought that he worked for KGB, but I saw him as a faithful 
Orthodox Christian who found ways of maximizing the elbow room for his beloved Church’s 
mission and activities in the world.”57 Borovoy himself admitted that he had an “absolute, 
hundred-percent trust” of Visser’t Hooft and all other presidents and leaders of the WCC, and 
also heads of the churches including Pope Paul VI, leadership of the SPCU, and heads of states 
and state secretaries58 because they recognized him as somebody who represented his church 
with exceptional sincerity and expertise despite his double duty as an instrument of the Soviet 
propaganda. On his part, Borovoy felt safe to tell them the truth about the situation of the ROC in 
the USSR because as he saw it, popes and presidents were not likely to be double agents. 
During his time at the Council, Borovoy had to make daily written reports for the department 
of the External Church Relations and deliver them together with all Council materials to the 
Soviet Embassy in Rome. He refused to go there himself because as he put it, “already 
everybody considered us spies.” So his colleague, Vladimir Kotliarov, had to do it because his 
image was already “tainted” by his likeness to Vladimir Lenin noted by the Italian press.59 To 
serve the interests of the church, Borovoy used these reports not only to inform the authorities 
but also to influence their decisions—as will be shown later. 
Borovoy’s work at the Council was not only politically complex but also physically and 
mentally exhausting. Almost every weekend he had to fly to Geneva to fulfill his responsibilities 
as the ROC representative in the WWC and to celebrate Sunday liturgy at his parish there.60 He 
even complained that between General Congregations and trips to Geneva, he could not take 
57 “In Memoriam: Archpriest Vitaly Borovoy (1916-2008),” signed by the co-editor Paul Mojzes, Religion in 
Eastern Europe XXVIII, 3 2008: 78. 
58 See "Мне верили абсолютно: Памяти отца Bиталия Борового." April 7, 2015. 
http://psmb.ru/community/article/mne-verili-absoljutno-5555/ 
59 Platonov. 
60 While Borovoy spend most of his time abroad, his wife and son were not allowed to join him– perhaps, as 
insurance that he will be coming back. 
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advantage of the invitation by the mayor La Pira to visit Florence because “all I have free is 
Thursday. But one day is not enough to get to Florence.”61 Still, he found time and energy for 
meaningful theological discussions and contributions. As one of his ecumenical colleagues 
remembered, Borovoy “was clearly the theologian among the Russian delegation, the most 
articulate in discussion, the clearest in explanation, and the one who was reaching out most for 
ecumenical ideas and contacts.”62 Although observers could not speak or vote at the General 
Congregation, they had another way of making their voice heard. Every Tuesday afternoon, the 
SPCU gathered them for two and a half hour long meetings (presided by Willebrands) in order to 
receive their comments on the documents under review. Bishops were also welcomed to these 
meetings. Borovoy described these meetings as part of the Council’s guarantee to provide all the 
observers with the possibility “to express their own opinion, make their own observations and 
state their own feelings at regular meetings with Catholic theologians and those taking part in the 
Council,”63 and he regularly made his contributions to these theological discussions.64 
 Of all the challenges that Borovoy faced at the Council, nothing tested his intelligence, his 
ability to hear and communicate with opponents, and most of all, his courage, as his involvement 
in the Vatican’s negotiations with the Soviet government to release Ukrainian Catholic 
Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj. Slipyj was arrested in April of 1945 as part of an effort to eliminate 
the Eastern Catholic Church in Ukraine. Convicted for alleged anti-Soviet activity and 
                                                          
61 Jung, 274. 
62 In Memoriam, 78-79. 
 
63 He also acknowledged two other guarantees of the Council such as “complete freedom of discussion and 
examination of all the questions by all those taking part in the Council” and “an attitude of an extraordinary attention 
towards the observers… Those in charge of the Council were always ready to defend the observers and the dignity 
of the Russian Orthodox Church.” Borovoy, 134. 
64 For Borovoy’s comments on episcopal collegiality see Dom Emmanuel Lanne. “La perception en Occident de la 
participation du Patriarcat de Moscou à Vatican II.” In Vatican II in Moscow (1959-1965). (Leuven: Bibliotheek van 
de Faculteit Godgeleerdheid. 1997), 126-127. 
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cooperation with the Fascist regime during the occupation, he remained for 18 years in 
deplorable conditions in a Siberian labor camp. Pope John XXIII, who was truly concerned with 
Slipyj’s condition and even kept the Metropolitan’s picture on his desk, was continuously 
advocating for his release. The presence of the ROC’s observers at the Council provided an 
opportunity to reach out to the Soviet government. According to Stransky, Borovoy was the one 
who played a key role in securing the success of these efforts.65 
 To better understand the events surrounding Slipyj’s release, they should to be placed in the 
context of what was happening in the world at that time. Only a few days after the opening of the   
Council (October 16-28), the so-called Cuban Nuclear Missile Crisis unfolded, when for twelve 
days, the world hung on the brink of a nuclear confrontation between the USA and the USSR. In 
search of a peaceful resolution of this crisis, the heads of these countries for the first time in 
history established direct contact. The Vatican also played its role in the peace process. On 
October 25, Pope John XXIII, in a radio address, appealed to all sides of the conflict with an 
urgent plea to avoid the nuclear disaster. This was the first time in Vatican history that it did not 
take the side of the capitalist West in a conflict with the USSR, but spoke simply on behalf of 
humanity. Soviet leadership acknowledged this new approach and the papal address was 
published simultaneously by the major Soviet newspaper Pravda (Правда) and the New York 
Times. 
 Right after the end of the Cuban crisis in November of 1962, the Pope asked his personal 
friend, the Secretary of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, Cardinal Gustavo Testa, to 
reach out to the ROC’s observers with a request to intercede for Slipyj’s release. The timing was 
right for this request because after the Cuban crisis, the Pope and Krushchev started to establish 
personal contact and even exchanged hand-written cards. In response, Borovoy mentioned 
                                                          
65 For detailed account of these events and analysis see Schelkens. 
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Testa’s request in his January report on the first session of the Council and then used all of his 
diplomatic skills in an effort to change the initially negative reaction of the Soviet authorities. He 
even gave a personal guarantee that the Vatican had no intentions of using Slipyj’s release for 
anti-Soviet propaganda or for any other political gain. Finally, in the end of January 1963, Slipyj 
was granted amnesty and was required to permanently leave the USSR. As promised, the Vatican 
informed of his arrival to Rome in February 1963 in a very restrained and non-political manner. 
 This incredible story of what Schelkens calls “a surprising act of confidence and good will 
from all sides”66 has a sad postscriptum. Since the first day at the Council, Borovoy was trying to 
personally contact the head of the Ukrainian Catholic delegation, Metrapolitan Hermaniuk. 
However, even after Slipyj was released and he himself met with Borovoy on several occasions, 
Hermaniuk refused Borovoy’s request.67 In my opinion, this was a lost opportunity, if not for 
institutional, then for a personal encounter and reconciliation. 
 Years later, Willebrands asked Borovoy about the personal risks that he took in securing 
Slipyj’s release. Borovoy replied that in doing so, he served the Lord’s Church. He also added 
that two problems still remained after Slipyj’s liberation: a big problem of the development of 
the Catholic Church in Russia, and a small problem of his own role and his personal risk.68 
Others who worked with him also remember him as a wise, courageous, and humble person, who 
moved them by his “dynamic vision of renewal and cooperation among Christians and other 
                                                          
66 Schelkens, 681. 
67 Galadza, 237-238. I cannot agree with Galadza when he, “abstracting from the observers’ personal merits,” 
justifies Hermaniuk’s decision simply by the fact that they were present at the Council on the assignment from the 
Politburo. (Galadza, 234) 
68 “je suis convaincu qu’en agissant ainsi j’ai servi l’Église, non seulement votre, église, mais l’eglise du Seigneur… 
La libération du Metropolite Slipyj peut devenir le signe d’un dévéloppement nouveau qui aura une importance très 
grande pour la situation de votre église dans notre pays et d’une manière inderecte aussi pour l’église orthodoxe. 
Deux problèmes se présentment encore, un grand problèm, c’est le dévélopment de votre église en Russie. Le petit 
problèm, c’est ma part et mon risqué personnel.” Schelkens, 705-706, note 83. 
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people of good will...[h]is penetrating intellect, broad knowledge of church history, and witty 
conversational style.”69 
 Although Borovoy did not consider the Council to be “ecumenical” in the historical, 
canonical and dogmatic sense,70 he shared its “completely positive valuation” by the ROC.71 
From his perspective, the Council demonstrated positive changes in the RCC, a new welcoming 
attitude toward Orthodoxy, and effectiveness of the ‘eastern policy’ of Paul VI through “a 
reasonable and deliberate substitution of unjustified bellicose and primitive forms of anti-
Communist and political anti-Sovietism from the 1940s and 1950s by changing them into more 
flexible and more effective ideological and diplomatic efforts to weaken the external and internal 
dynamic of the Soviet system (from within the Socialist camp) by means of domestication and 
assimilation.”72 
Noticing that some documents of the Council were written under the influence of the Russian 
Orthodox theology and philosophy, he even expressed hope that its work will be helpful in 
preparation of the future pan-Orthodox council and Orthodox aggiornamento.73 
Conclusion 
Fifty years later, how can we evaluate the participation in the Council of the observers from 
the ROC in general and Borovoy in particular? 
69 Paul Mojzes. “In Memoriam: Archpriest Vitaly Borovoy (1916-2008),” Religion in Eastern Europe XXVIII, 3 
2008: 78. 
70 Borovoy,130. 
71 Borovoy, 137. 
72 Borovoy, 135-136. 
73 “Ecco il motive per cui molto della riccezza teologica e dell’esperienza conciliare del Concilio Vaticano II ci può 
essere utile nella fase preparatoria dei nostri Concili e del nostro aggiornamento.” Vitalij Borovoij, “Il significato 
del Concilio Vaticano II per la Chiesa ortodossa russa.” In Vatican II in Moscow (1959-1965). Leuven: Bibliotheek 
van de Faculteit Godgeleerdheid. 1997, 73-90. P. 90 
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 From the perspective of the ROC’s well being, this participation contributed to the assurance 
of its physical survival in the USSR, helped to overcome the stereotype that there was neither 
church nor religion in the communist Soviet Union, and allowed the international Christian 
community to get to know the ROC and its perils. As a result, even in the conditions of physical 
assault on its property and structure and poisonous anti-religious propaganda, the ROC not only 
survived but grew. Despite the fact that the numbers of clergy and active parishes diminished 
almost by a half by the end of 1965, the number of baptisms grew and so did the church’s 
income.74 
 From the political perspective, through the ROC’s involvement with the Council and with the 
WCC, the USSR indeed managed to silence many of its Christian critics. Decidedly anti-Soviet 
Orthodox emmigrants held that the creation and widening of relations with the RCC mostly 
strengthened the communist regime in the USSR. Refering to Metropolitan Nikodim’s vast 
international outreach, émigré newspapers cried out: “The red metropolitan reaches out where 
the red tank could not.”75 In line with this position, Borovoy himself later was attacked by the 
American popular magazine Reader’s Digest, which implied that he ran WCC as a Soviet 
agent.76 
 From the perspective of the Catholic Church, this participation laid a foundation for the 
normalization of the relationships between the ROC and the RCC and “objectively opened a 
chapter of brotherhood between the churches.”77 It was followed by numerous theological 
conversations, starting in 1967 in Leningrad, and even the ROC’s presence at John Paul I’s 
                                                          
74 “In 1965 the revenue of the Moscow Patriarchate increased by 5,000,000 rubles, to 90,000,000 rubles (in present-
day values).” Shkarovskii, 94. 
75 О. Сергей Голованов. "Очерк истории католического апостолата в русском зарубежье в 1017-1991гг." 
http://www.krotov.info/libr_min/04_g/ol/ovanov_04.htm. 
76 "Мне верили абсолютно: Памяти отца Виталия Борового." April 7, 2015. 
http://psmb.ru/community/article/mne-verili-absoljutno-5555/. Here Borovoy probably refers to an article by 
Clarence W. Hall “Which Way the World Council of Churches?” Reader’s Digest, November 1971, 177-189. 
77 Melloni, 94. 
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inauguration on September 3, 1978.78 In practice, however, not much was done for the 
improvement of the existence of the RCC in the USSR, while the Eastern Catholics had to wait 
until 1989-1990 to regain their right to exist. 
From the perspective of intra-Orthodox relations, some say that the manner in which the 
ROC got to the Council seriously injured Orthodox unity, an injury that played out even in 
preparations for the pan-Orthodox synod in 2016.79 Clearly, the rift between Moscow and 
Constantinople was not created in connection with the Council; it was growing at least since the 
beginning of the sixteenth century when the See of Moscow started to identify itself as a “Third 
Rome”—a final incarnation of the Christian empire.80 This rift was certainly deepened on the eve 
of the Council by the meddling of the secular political forces in ecclesial relations. Perhaps, the 
healing of this injury can be accomplished only if all sides free themselves from the dangerous 
mingling of national, political, and ecclesial interests. 
There still remains the thorny issue of the sincerity of the ROC’s ecumenical efforts. There 
are many today, especially in Russia, who minimize the significance of the ROC’s past 
ecumenical engagements, including the participation in the Council, insisting that it was 
motivated solely by the need to survive under the pressure from the Soviet authorities. 
Paradoxically, this argument is used by those who want to purify and increase the ROC’s 
ecumenical efforts as well as by those who want to backtrack on their church’s ecumenical 
commitment made in the past. 
78 Sadly, the head of the delegation Metropolitan Nikodim who in 1970 received a degree of master of theology for a 
dissertation on the life and work of Pope John XXIII, had a fatal heart attack right in the papal study. His sudden 
death followed soon by the death of Pope John Paul I also from a heart attack, gave rise to various conspiracy 
theories, including one that Nikodim’s death was a result of an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Pope.   
79 Radu Bordeianu. “The Role of Orthodox Observers at the Second Vatican Council,” a presentation at the 
conference “Vatican II: Remebering the Future,” May 2015, Georgetown University. 
80 This claim was based on a belief widespread in Russian ecclesial circles that in the late Byzantine period 
Constantinople succumbed to Latin theological positions while Moscow in its adherence to tradition preserved the 
purity of the Orthodox faith and life. This idea is reincarnated today both in Russian political and ecclesiastical 
affairs in the doctrines of the Russian World. 
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 Methodologically speaking, it is impossible to definitively resolve this paradox on an 
institutional level; the best one can do is to assess the actions of the involved individuals in light 
of their whole lives and through testimonies of “those who were there.” From this perspective, 
there is no doubt that Borovoy was entirely sincere in his motives not only to protect his Church 
but to work for true Christian unity. He managed to transcend his required role as the 
government’s mouthpiece and became a true voice of his Church. Through him, the ROC 
demonstrated its commitment to tirelessly search for new ways of Christian reconciliation and 
unity of all people. Thus, Borovoy’s participation in the work of the Council is a compelling 
example of the importance and fruitfulness of personal human encounter in ecumenical work, 
especially when churches and institutions are not friendly with each other. 
 In his life, Borovoy managed to combine seemingly incompatible things: born as a poor 
fatherless peasant, he received a world-class education and achieved world renown for his 
scholarship; he did not want to be either a priest or diplomat, yet became a nurturing pastor and 
an influential diplomat; he had a mild speech impairment and a “peasant-like” accent yet became 
a sought after preacher that touched the hearts and minds of both simple and refined; he had an 
international reputation and was held in high regard by people in power yet he did not use it to 
his benefit and until the last day, remained humble, dying in relative obscurity and poverty 
surrounded by his many books. Finally, in circumstances of external coercion, preassure, and 
control, he maintained inner freedom of spirit and creativity of the mind and met all hardships 
with endless wit and humor.  
 Borovoy’s paradoxical life reminds of a paradox of Christian ministry described by St. Paul: 
We are afflicted in every way, but not constrained;  
perplexed, but not driven to despair;  
persecuted, but not abandoned;  
struck down, but not destroyed… (2 Cor 4: 8) 
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We are treated as deceivers and yet are truthful;  
as unrecognized and yet acknowledged;  
as dying and behold we live; as chastised and yet not put to death;  
as sorrowful yet always rejoicing;  
as poor yet enriching many; as having nothing and yet possessing all things. (2 Cor 6:8-10) 
 
Each of these lines accurately describes the life of Fr. Vitali Borovoy, a true “agent of Jesus 
Christ.” 
Post scriptum 
 In his long life, Borovoy met many in Europe and in the United States. Perhaps, there are 
some of those who knew him and would like to share their memories of this remarkable person. 
Hopefully, this will help to shed light on unknown pages of his long ecumenical career and 
maybe even solve the following mystery. In the east apse of the Basilica of the National Shrine 
of the Immaculate Conception in Washington, D.C., there is a mosaic depicting Pope John XXIII 
and 19 participants of the Council. One of them is Fr. Borovoy! How did the Russian Orthodox 
priest from a communist country come to be selected for this small group of people that were 
probably meant to represent the Universal Church?  
 I would greatly appreciate any comments or suggestions at anastaciawooden@gmail.com.  
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